Abstract. We study the analysis of collusion involving cost-asymmetric firms under leniency programmes. These programmes reduce fines for cartel members who report themselves to and assist the antitrust authority. This article investigates the impact of mergers on collusion. We show that if firms prior to merger have high production capacities, then the scope of variation of the parameters under which firms tend to collude is reduced. Some important policy implications can be derived from our results. When it examines a merger, an antitrust authority will usually compare the case where the merger is accepted with an attendant risk of collusion with the benchmark case in which competition is present ex-post. This benchmark scenario is problematic because the antitrust authority does not take into account the possible collusion after a rejection of a merger, which is what we analyse here. This article does not only provide necessary and sufficient conditions for collusion to be enforced but we determine whether collusion is actually taking place.
Introduction
Collusion enables firms to exert market power they would not otherwise have, restrict competition and increase prices. Combatting collusion is a major area of activity for any antitrust authority. In particular, this point is addressed in merger cases. Ex ante, competition authorities can prevent the emergence of an industry structure that is prone to collusion, by taking into account this concern when examining proposed mergers. They can also ban facilitating practices. Ex post, competition authorities can take steps to fight collusion per se, e.g., by uncovering evidence of explicit coordination or by attacking specific agreements that again facilitate collusion. The leniency programmes increase the implements of the ex-post control.
Economic theory suggests that a merger might engender the creation of collusive outcomes because the merger reduces the number of firms and also gives rise to a more symmetric distribution of assets. Penard (1997) modelled such an outcome by way of a non-cooperative repeated game in which firms choose their capacities as a first stage and then compete indefinetly on price in the second stage to show that symmetric markets are more prone to collusion than are asymmetric markets. Here, mergers do not only influence the number of firms in the industry but also affect the distribution of the production capacity amongst all firms in the industry in question. Received wisdom suggests that asymmetry in production capacity tends to hinder collusion. Lambson (1995) suggested for example that introducing an asymmetry in capacities hinders tacit collusion, and Deneckere and Davidson (1984) , (1990) suggested that asymmetry capacities make collusion more difficult in duopolies, where particular forms of collusive strategies are used. Compte et al. (2002) , inspired by the Nestlé-Perrier merger case 1 , suggested that the introduction of asymmetric capacities makes collusion more difficult to sustain when aggregate capacity is limited. As for asymmetric costs, giving larger shares of the collusive profits to the bigger firms alleviates somewhat the tension generated by asymmetric capacities, but it does not eradicate it entirely, and the scope for collusion is nonetheless reduced.
We analyse how asymmetry in cost function across firms, as was suggested by Perry-Porter (1985) , can affect the scope of collusion after a merger. Rothschild (1999) and Vasconcelos (2005) both dealt with collusion under cost asymmetry when firms competeà la Cournot. Rothschild used standard grim trigger strategies. Vasconcelos looked for more general punishments with a stick-and-carrot structure as proposed by Abreu (1986 Abreu ( , 1988 and analysed tacit collusion in quantity-supergames involving costasymmetric firms and showed that if a merger brings about an increase in the inequality of asset holdings then collusion will be inhibited.
All proposed mergers notified to the antitrust authority are examined to see if they would significantly impede effective competition. The antitrust authority analyses if the proposed merger can make it more likely or more effective for firms to coordinate their actions (coordinated effects) and if it can make it profitable for the merging firms to reduce output and raise price unilaterally (unilateral effects) 2 .
When it examines the risk of coordinated effects, an antitrust authority will usually compare the situation where the merger is accepted with an attendant risk of collusion with the benchmark case in which competition is present ex-post. But the latter is a strong assumption since it considers that firms automatically act competitively after a rejection of a project of merger. The antitrust authority does not take into account the possible collusion after a rejection of a merger. In this paper, we consider the possibility for firms to collude if the merger is rejected.
Another strand of literature related to this paper deals with leniency programmes (as Motta-Polo, 2003 )(henceforth LP). These programmes reduce fines for cartel members who report themselves to and assist the antitrust authority, and the impact of LP can be seen in the recent increase in successfully cartel investigations. For example, in 19 months, over 2002 and 2003, the European Commission made 19 decisions, involving more than 100 firms, with totalling almost 3 billion Euros. The presence of LP introduces a coordination game between the cartel members (apply for leniency or not?).
As in Motta-Polo (2003) , leniency programs have two possible effects. The first is the derogation from the cartel agreement by firms which report to the antitrust authority. The second (being a negative effect) is the attenuation of the expected cost of anticompetitive behaviour because of reduced fines. The key mechanism of LP is the rule that allows firms to receive fine reductions even after an investigation is opened.
All the papers on mergers and collusion tend to look at a minimal discount factor threshold for collusion to be sustained. This article does not suggest necessary and sufficient conditions for collusion to be enforced but we do analyse the choice which firms have as to whether to collude. We look at the equilibrium path of firms; here we determine whether collusion is actually taking place.
In this paper, we show that a merger, under certain conditions, can create a market structure which decreases the possibility of collusion. In particular, when two firms with high production capacities merge, then the space of parameters for which firms collude decreases after this merger. This is an important result for the antitrust authority because the impact of a merger on collusion depends of which firms it involves.
The article is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the basic model. Characterizations of equilibria and implications for merger control are provided in section 3. Concluding remarks follow in section 4. Proofs of results and graphics appear in the appendix.
The model
Consider an industry with n asymmetric firms. By asymmetry it is meant that firms have a different share of a specific asset that affects marginal costs. More precisely, in the model, two identical firms are to have the same production capacity, denoted by k 1 = k 2 . The other firms are to have the same fraction of the industry capital stock k j (∀j ∈ n, j = 1, 2). This asymmetry is introduced in each firm's cost function. A firm is deemed large for the purposes of the model if it owns a large fraction of the capital stock.
Following Perry and Porter (1985) , cost is assumed to be dependant on the capital owned by the firms :
where q i denotes the quantity chosen by firm i, ∀i ∈ [1, n] and c is the marginal cost, which is the same for all firms. Fixed costs are zero.
Cost asymmetry is conventionnally seen as hindering collusion because low-cost firms are more difficult to discipline, both because they might gain more from undercutting their rivals and because they have less to fear from possible retaliation from high-cost firms.
Firms compete on a Cournot basis with a homogeneous product. We assume that the demand function is linear i.e., p = 1 − Q.
Firms can make collusive agreements after firms 1 and 2 have proposed a merger which has either been accepted or rejected by the competition authority in the first period. The outcome of the execution of a collusive agreement is assumed to be that the colluding firms will thence reduce output below the competitive level. Quantity competition also affects retaliation possibilities as well as the short-run gains of deviations from collusive conduct. Indeed, under quantity competition, one is less tempted to increase production levels in order to deviate from a tacitly collusive level, since prices will adjust to enable the competitors to sell all their output.
This would tend to make collusion easier to sustain. However, retaliation is somewhat harder under quantity competition because the firm that is the object of retaliation can always soften the blow (compared to a situation of price competition) by changing its output level accordingly.
We extend the framework of Motta-Polo (2003) by a first stage in which the antitrust authority decides to accept or reject a notification of merger between two firms.
The antitrust authorities (henceforth : AA) use leniency programmes; these programmes provide the incentive of reduced fines to firms which reveal information about collusion to the AA.
Four parameters summarize the enforcement policy, being:
• F ∈ [0,F ] : the value of the fine if firms are detected by the AA and have not cooperated with it,F being the maximum possible fine which can be imposed.
• f ∈ [0, F ] : the value of the reduced fine for the firm which denounces the collusive agreement. It is assumed that all firms which cooperate with the AA will be granted reduced fines. It is also assumed that the reduction is high enough in order for the LP be really effective because if f is close to the full fine, F there is no incentive to reveal.
• α ∈ [0, 1] : the probability that firm is reviewed by the AA.
• p ∈ [0, 1] : the probability that the AA successfully concludes the investigation when firms do not cooperate.
These parameters are assumed to be exogenous. Type I errors (firms not colluding are still prosecuted) are assumed not to happen and Type II errors (colluding firms not fined) are assumed to happen.
The collusion strategy is modelled on the basis of a trigger strategy : once a firm deviates from the collusive agreement, all the firms will play non cooperatively until the end of the game. These strategies have been initially suggested by Friedman (1971) .
The timing of the game is as follows :
The game starts (t = 0) with the AA approving or rejecting the notification of the merger between two firms, 1 and 2.
After this first stage, the game is repeated indefinetly. This can now be formally described as follows.
At t = 1, firms decide to reach a collusive agreement or to deviate (playing non cooperatively). If no firm deviates until a time t then they collude again and get a profit π M . We study the case in which firms can sustain the joint profit maximisation, so the subscript M indicates a collusive outcome since collusion aims at monopolizing the industry. If at time t the AA decides to open an investigation then there are two assumed outcomes :
• Cooperation : firms denounce the cartel to the AA; they pay the reduced fine f and play non cooperatively during one period and restart collusion after an inquiry is concluded. If however a firm deviates from the collusive agreement, firms play non cooperatively until the end of the game.
• No cooperation : the investigation begins at t + 1. If firms are not condemned with probability (1 − p) then they continue to play cooperatively; if they are found guilty, then they pay the total fine F and they have to play non cooperatively during one period. As in the cooperation case, in one firm deviates from the collusive agreement, firms play non cooperatively until the end of the game.
Consequently, in this game, there are two types of deviation : the deviation from the collusive agreement and the reporting to the AA. The equilibrium of the game can now be analysed.
Equilibria
This section describes all the various types of equilibria. We describe the perfect Nash equilibria of the game and we have to resolve this game considering merger or not in the first period. Motta and Polo (2003) suggested that there are three types of equilibria : no collusion (NC), collusion and revelation (CR) and collusion and no revelation (CNR). The existence of these equilibria depends on the value of the relevant parameters.
CR equilibrium exists if the profit of firm colluding and revealing to the AA is greater than the profit of a firm which deviates. CNR equilibrium exists if firm which colludes and does not reveal information has no incentive to reveal information to the AA and also to deviate from the collusive agreement. Let δ ∈ (0, 1) be the common discount factor. The results obtained by Motta-Polo (2003) are as follows: lemma 1. (Motta-Polo (2003) for low values of f )
• for p ∈ [0, p CN R ) and α ∈ [0, min(1, α N C ) : CNR exists.
• for p ∈ [p N C , 1] and α ∈ [max(α N C , α CR ), 1] : NC exists.
• for p ∈ [p CN R , 1] and α ∈ [0, α CR ) : CR exists.
with:
[Insert figure 1] Figure 1 in the appendix represents the Subgame Perfect Equilibria graphically.
The region labelled 1 in the figure 1 represents the area where parameters represent CR under leniency programs with no actual leniency. Region 2 represents the area where the parameters are such as to which make ex-post desistence more easy by encouraging revelation and by shortening investigations time.
Note that α CR ≥ 0 for δ ≥δ =
which is the usual critical discount factor when firms collude with no threat of prosecution.
The impact of a merger on collusion
In this subsection, the first stage of the game is examined in more detail. Two cases must be analysed depending on whether the merger is accepted in the first period or not. If the AA rejects the merger in the first period, then the repeated game is played with n firms. As said before, the two firms which are proposing to merge are identical (k 1 = k 2 ). The others have the same production capacity :
Received wisdom suggests that mergers may tend to create structural conditions which facilitate collusion. First, coordination is easier to sustain when the number of competitors is smaller and secondly, as the number of firms decreases, each firm gets a higher share of the market. This has two implications, the gain from deviating decreases for each firm and the longterm benefit of maintaining collusion is increased because it gets a higher share of the collusive profit.
The impact of a merger on collusion is captured in our framework by the comparative static on α CR .
To do this, we compute the value of φ = α bm CR α am CR where the superscripts bm and am denote the threshold value α CR before and after the merger. If φ is stricly greater than unity, then the border line α CR in figure 1 moves down. Therefore, there exist some values of α and p for which firms collude and reveal before merger whereas they do not collude if the merger is accepted by the AA. In other words, a merger would attenuate the scope of collusion.
Individual profit functions of the firms (∀i = 1...n) are given by :
Proof. See Appendix A.
These profit functions correspond to the case where a proposed merger is rejected in the first period (n firms compete in the industry). If the merger is accepted in the first period (n − 1 firms), production capacity of the merger entity is calculated as follows : k 1+2 = k 1 + k 2 = 2k 1 . To simplify the calculation, we assume that c = 0.
Numerical simulations of φ andδ are represented in figure 2 in the appendix.
We see in figure 2 for k 1 high enough (k 1 > 0.3) and where δ is sufficiently high then φ > 1. But for low values of k 1 , φ is always stricly less than unity (which is represented by a plane with φ = 0).
The following proposition gives the impact of a merger on collusion :
proposition 1. With high (resp. low) production capacity of the merging firms, a merger will reduce (resp. increase) the space of parameters under which firms tend to collude.
The inference to be drawn from this result is that the larger the firm, the more able it is to derogate from the collusion agreement because the ability of outsiders to punish deviations is attenuated.
Implications for merger control
Assessing the scope for collusion is a difficult issue.
All the papers on mergers and collusion tend to look at a minimal discount factor threshold for collusion to be sustained. However, the fact that firms could sustain collusion does not mean that they really succeed in doing it. This paper does not suggest necessary and sufficient conditions for collusion to be enforced but we do analyse the choice which firms have as to whether to collude. We look at the equilibrium path of firms; here we predict whether collusion is actually taking place.
Some important policy implications can be derived from our results. They shed some light on the complex problem of assessing the potential jointdominance effects which some mergers bring about. The impact of a merger depends on the nature of the firms involved. The antitrust authorities have to approve, under certain conditions, a merger between two "'big"' firms in order to fight collusion (these result reinforce those obtained by Vasconcelos, 2005) . But when small firms want to merge, the risk of collusion is increased.
Therefore, mergers reinforcing market asymmetry should be considered by AA as pro-competitive. Remark that this point is divergent from the analysis of unilateral effects because although the asymmetric distribution of costs has the effect of reducing the likelihood of collusion, the implication is, clearly, that dominance is increased.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have analysed how a merger can affect the likelihood of collusion. We have showed that the scope of collusion can be decreased depending on the asymmetry in cost function between firms. In particular, when two "'big"' firms merge then the scope of collusion is decreased because there is less necessity or need to do so.
These findings suggest policy implications. Indeed, when an AA decides to approve or to reject a merger, it must compare two situations : the risk of collusion after a merger is accepted and the risk of collusion after it is rejected. with β = (β i ) q i = k i * Q and then we replace in the profit function to obtain the nash profit.
COLLUSION PROFIT We suppose that monopoly aggregate output is simply divided in proportion to capital endowments.
2b+1 and then we replace in the profit function to obtain the collusion profit.
DEVIATION PROFIT As in Rothschild (1999) , we suppose here that deviation takes the form which is conventionally assumed in models of this type : the deviant takes the allocated cartel outputs of all other firms as given and selects the output which maximizes its own profits. We have to fix the amount of the reduced fine. Here is a graphical representation for f = 2 but we obtain the same graphic if we vary f provided that the reduced fine is low enough.
